Computational cryptography
Foundational assumption

Public-key encryption / two-message key exchange exist

In plain words

Can two strangers agree on a secret while everyone is listening? Can you lock a message with a padlock anyone can close but only you can open? This box assumes yes, which needs more than one-way functions.

The idea: A plain one-way function lets you lock something that only you can open later, but not something a stranger can lock for you, or a secret two strangers can agree on in public. For that the problem needs extra structure: a hidden shortcut (a trapdoor, as in RSA), or a way for two secrets to combine (as in Diffie-Hellman). The second needs less: Diffie-Hellman gives encryption without any trapdoor. Impagliazzo and Rudich showed that no straightforward ("black-box") construction gets this from a one-way function alone, which is why it's a separate, stronger bet.

Why it matters: It's how your browser sets up a private connection to a site it has never talked to before.

The details

On the map: needs more than one-way functions (Cryptomania). Quantum computers don't change that for classical keys (no black-box construction, Li-Li-Li-Liu 2026). Only QKD sidesteps it, with a quantum channel. If it were impossible, every assumption tagged KE would fall, with everything built on it. Untagged ones (ECDLP, isogeny paths, SIS, standard-noise LPN) are only known to give signatures, hashes or OT extension

The assumption that you can encrypt to someone's public key, or equivalently that two strangers can agree on a secret in two messages over a public channel: Alice's message works as her public key, which is exactly how Diffie-Hellman becomes ElGamal encryption[1]. Key agreement with more messages might exist even without public-key encryption: Rudich built oracle worlds where k messages suffice but k-1 don't[2]. Every assumption on the map that gives key exchange gives the two-message kind.

Public-key encryption is strictly more than one-way functions: Impagliazzo and Rudich showed it can't be built from one-way functions in a black-box way[3], and Li, Li, Li and Liu (published 2026, preprint 2025)[4] showed quantum computers don't change that for classical keys. Impagliazzo called this world "Cryptomania"[5].

Every assumption tagged KE on the map gives key exchange on its own. So if public-key encryption turned out to be impossible, all of them would fall, and with them RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ML-KEM and McEliece. Untagged ones such as ECDLP, isogeny paths, SIS and standard-noise LPN are only known to give signatures, hashes or OT extension.

A trapdoor function, the hidden shortcut behind RSA, gives public-key encryption but is a stronger bet: see the trapdoor box beside this one.

The only known way around it uses physics instead of hardness: quantum key distribution[6].

Rests on

If any of these breaks, this breaks too.

If it falls

If this breaks, these break with it.

Everything that falls with it (46 boxes)

References

  1. Taher ElGamal. A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms. Advances in Cryptology, 1985. doi:10.1007/3-540-39568-7_2
  2. Steven Rudich. The Use of Interaction in Public Cryptosystems. Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’91, 1991. doi:10.1007/3-540-46766-1_19
  3. R. Impagliazzo and S. Rudich. Limits on the provable consequences of one-way permutations. Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '89, 1989. doi:10.1145/73007.73012
  4. Longcheng Li, Qian Li, Xingjian Li and Qipeng Liu. Cryptomania v.s. Minicrypt in a Quantum World. Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2026. doi:10.1007/978-3-032-35409-9_1
  5. R. Impagliazzo. A personal view of average-case complexity. Proceedings of Structure in Complexity Theory. Tenth Annual IEEE Conference, 1995. doi:10.1109/sct.1995.514853
  6. Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing. Theoretical Computer Science, 2014. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2014.05.025