Computational cryptography › Protocols › encrypted channels
Protocol

TLS 1.3

In plain words

The "S" in HTTPS: it sets up a private, authenticated connection to a website.

The idea: In one round trip, your browser and the server do a key exchange (today usually X25519 combined with ML-KEM), the server signs the conversation with the key in its certificate to prove it's really that site, and a certificate authority's signature on the certificate vouches for that key. HKDF derives keys from the shared secret, and everything after that is sent with authenticated encryption. Break the key exchange and recorded traffic can be read. Break the signatures and someone can impersonate the site.

Why it matters: It's behind the padlock in your browser bar.

What happens when you open an HTTPS site
Your browserWebsiteHello + key shareX25519 + ML-KEMHello + key shareCertificatesigned by a certificate authoritySignature over the handshakeproves it owns the certificate's keyFinisheda MAC over everything so farFinishedYour data, with authenticated encryptionboth sides now share a secret, and HKDF turns it into keyseverything below is encrypted
A TLS 1.3 connection in one round trip. The key shares (purple) set up a shared secret, which is why breaking key exchange would expose recorded traffic. The certificate and signature (pink) prove you are talking to the real site, which is why breaking signatures would allow impersonation. Everything after the website's hello is already encrypted.

The details

On the map: hybrid KEM + RSA/ECDSA certificates + AES-GCM + HKDF falls if ANY part falls

Secures HTTPS and most other internet traffic[1].

The certificates are still classical: a future quantum computer couldn't decrypt recorded traffic protected by the hybrid, but could impersonate servers in real time until post-quantum certificates arrive.

Rests on

If any of these breaks, this breaks too.

If it falls

If this breaks, these break with it.

Nothing on the map depends on it: it is an end point, something people use directly.

References

  1. E. Rescorla. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3. RFC 8446, 2018. rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446
  2. Kris Kwiatkowski, Panos Kampanakis, Bas Westerbaan and Douglas Stebila. Post-quantum hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3 (Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem). IETF TLS working group, 2024. datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem
  3. Google Security Blog. A new path for Kyber on the web. 2024. security.googleblog.com/2024/09/a-new-path-for-kyber-on-web.html
  4. H. Krawczyk and P. Eronen. HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF). RFC 5869, 2010. rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869