Signatures that prove DNS answers (which address a website name points to) weren't forged.
The idea: Each DNS zone signs its records, and its parent zone vouches for the zone's key by signing a fingerprint of it, all the way up to the root zone, whose key is built into resolvers. A resolver can follow that chain of signatures and reject forged answers. It proves answers are authentic but doesn't hide them.
Why it matters: Helps stop attackers sending you to fake sites, but it's hard to make quantum-safe.
On the map: signatures only (RSA, ECDSA P-256, Ed25519), no encryption. PQ signatures are too big for DNS packets: no migration path yet
Signs DNS records so resolvers can check that answers weren't forged[1, 2]. It uses signatures only (RSA, ECDSA P-256, Ed25519) and provides no confidentiality.
Its post-quantum migration is hard: post-quantum signatures are kilobytes, too large for DNS messages, which should stay under about 1,232 bytes to avoid fragmentation[3]. Research into compact alternatives is ongoing. A zone falls if the signature algorithm it uses falls.
If any of these breaks, this breaks too.
If this breaks, these break with it.
Nothing on the map depends on it: it is an end point, something people use directly.