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Hardness assumption

Hash security for PQ schemes

In plain words

Every quantum-safe plan for Ethereum leans on hash functions staying secure. Which hash to use is still being decided.

The idea: When elliptic curves fall, hashes are what's left: hash-based signatures, Merkle trees and STARK proofs all come down to "nobody can find collisions or second preimages". That's the most battle-tested bet in cryptography, but each plan has to pick a hash, and the proof-friendly ones like Poseidon are much younger than SHA-2 or SHA-3.

Why it matters: Hashes are the most battle-tested assumption, which is why the roadmap leans on them.

The details

On the map: collision + second-preimage resistance of a hash still being chosen: SHA-2 / SHA-3 / BLAKE (leanVM), Poseidon (leanSig prototype)

Every post-quantum plan on this map rests on hash security: collision and second-preimage resistance of whichever hash is chosen. leanVM currently uses BLAKE2s as a placeholder[1] and considers SHA-2, SHA-3 and BLAKE3. The leanSig prototype uses Poseidon[2]. The binary tree's hash is undecided[3].

Choosing a well-studied hash makes the assumption conservative. Choosing a proof-friendly one like Poseidon makes proofs faster but rests on younger cryptanalysis. It is the main open design choice behind the post-quantum roadmap.

Rests on

If any of these breaks, this breaks too.

If it falls

If this breaks, these break with it.

References

  1. lean Ethereum contributors. leanVM: Minimal zkVM for Ethereum. GitHub, 2025. github.com/leanEthereum/leanVM
  2. Justin Drake, Dmitry Khovratovich, Mikhail Kudinov and Benedikt Wagner. Hash-Based Multi-Signatures for Post-Quantum Ethereum. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2025/055. eprint.iacr.org/2025/055
  3. Vitalik Buterin, Guillaume Ballet, Dankrad Feist et al. EIP-7864: Ethereum state using a unified binary tree. Ethereum Improvement Proposals (Draft), 2025. eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7864