Computational cryptography › Live on mainnet today
Foundational assumption

No large-scale quantum computer

In plain words

A large quantum computer would break the elliptic curves behind Ethereum's accounts, validator signatures, blob commitments and most zero-knowledge verifiers.

The idea: Ordinary computers attack factoring and discrete logs by clever searching, and the work grows extremely fast with key size. A quantum computer can instead recast these problems as finding the repeating period of a sequence, and quantum interference finds periods efficiently. RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curves all hide their secret in exactly such a period. Lattices, codes and hashes have no hidden period known to quantum algorithms, which is why they are the replacements.

Why it matters: It's why Ethereum's roadmap moves to hash-based cryptography by around 2029.

Shor's trick: find the repeating pattern
1071421331475461371879410131111271341413150713xrepeats every 4 steps
The remainders of 7x divided by 15 repeat every 4 steps. That period gives away the factors: 72 - 1 = 48 shares the factor 3 with 15, and 72 + 1 = 50 shares the factor 5. For a 600-digit number the period is astronomically long and ordinary computers can't find it. A quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can, using interference. Discrete logs fall to the same idea.

The details

On the map: Shor breaks secp256k1, P-256, BLS12-381 and BN254: accounts, validators, blobs and most ZK verifiers

A large, error-corrected quantum computer running Shor's algorithm would compute elliptic-curve discrete logs efficiently[1, 2]. That breaks secp256k1 (account signatures), P-256 (passkeys), BLS12-381 (validator signatures, KZG blobs) and BN254 (most ZK verifiers on Ethereum).

Hashes and symmetric crypto only face Grover's square-root speedup[3], which longer outputs absorb, which is why the post-quantum roadmap moves to hash-based signatures and proofs.

The most exposed part is accounts: any account that has sent a transaction has revealed its public key onchain, and a quantum attacker could derive the private key from it. Nobody can say when such a machine will exist, but resource estimates have fallen steadily[4], and Ethereum's roadmap targets post-quantum security before the end of the decade[5].

Rests on

If any of these breaks, this breaks too.

If it falls

If this breaks, these break with it.

Everything that falls with it (24 boxes)

References

  1. Peter W. Shor. Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer. SIAM Journal on Computing, 1997. doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172
  2. Martin Roetteler, Michael Naehrig, Krysta M. Svore and Kristin Lauter. Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms. Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_9
  3. Lov K. Grover. A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '96, 1996. doi:10.1145/237814.237866
  4. Craig Gidney. How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits. arXiv:2505.15917, 2025. arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917
  5. Justin Drake, Julian Ma, Toni Wahrstätter and Vitalik Buterin. L1 Strawmap: Ethereum Draft Roadmap. Ethereum Foundation Protocol, 2026. strawmap.org