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ZK PROOFPrimitiveROMFS

STARK verifiers

In plain words

Proofs of correct computation built only from hash functions.

The idea: The computation's steps are written into a big table, and the table is turned into polynomials that only behave nicely if every step was right. The prover commits to them with Merkle trees, and the verifier asks to see a few random spots. Cheating anywhere would make the polynomials badly irregular, so random spot checks catch it with overwhelming probability. Hashing the commitments replaces the verifier's random questions (Fiat-Shamir), so the proof is just a file that anyone can check.

Why it matters: Used by rollups like Starknet, and likely quantum-safe.

The details

On the map: hash-based, transparent (e.g. Starknet)

STARKs prove that a computation was done correctly using only hash functions[1]: no trusted setup, and plausibly secure against quantum computers. Proofs are larger than SNARKs, tens to hundreds of KB.

Starknet verifies STARK proofs directly on Ethereum. Many other ZK rollups prove with STARKs but wrap the result in a small BN254 SNARK to save gas, which brings back pairing assumptions. Security relies on the hash (often Poseidon or Keccak), the random oracle model (ROM)[2] and, for many parameter choices, a still-unproven form of the FRI proximity-gap conjectures (the strongest form was disproved in 2025)[3].

Rests on

If any of these breaks, this breaks too.

If it falls

If this breaks, these break with it.

About the tags

ROM
Its security proof treats a hash function as a perfectly random function (the random oracle model). Real hashes aren't random functions, so this is a heuristic. For signatures and encryption no practical attack has exploited it. For multi-round proof systems, see the Fiat-Shamir box.
FS
Made non-interactive with the Fiat-Shamir transform, so it falls if Fiat-Shamir fails for it. Fiat-Shamir is proven only for an idealized hash, see its box.

References

  1. Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/046. eprint.iacr.org/2018/046
  2. Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa and Nicholas Spooner. Interactive Oracle Proofs. Theory of Cryptography, 2016. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_2
  3. Benjamin E. Diamond and Angus Gruen. On the Distribution of the Distances of Random Words. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2025/2010. eprint.iacr.org/2025/2010