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Hardness assumption

Seed preimage resistance

In plain words

Even with a quantum computer, nobody can work backwards from your keys to your seed words.

The idea: Quantum computers turn public keys into private keys, but they don't reverse hashes efficiently: the best they can do is a square-root speedup on guessing. Your seed sits behind such one-way functions, so even after a quantum attacker computes your private key, the seed stays out of reach. That makes "prove you know the seed" a way to tell the real owner from a thief, which the emergency plan relies on.

Why it matters: This is what the emergency recovery plan relies on.

The details

On the map: PBKDF2 / HMAC-SHA512 can't be inverted to recover a BIP-32 seed (Shor only recovers the key)

The assumption that a wallet's BIP-32 seed can't be recovered from the keys derived from it[1]. Derivation uses HMAC-SHA512, a one-way function, so even a quantum attacker who computes a private key from a public key still can't find the seed: quantum computers only speed up that search quadratically.

The emergency fork plan uses this to let real owners prove ownership with a proof of knowing the seed[2].

Rests on

If any of these breaks, this breaks too.

If it falls

If this breaks, these break with it.

References

  1. Pieter Wuille. BIP 32: Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets. Bitcoin Improvement Proposals, 2012. github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki
  2. Vitalik Buterin. How to hard-fork to save most users' funds in a quantum emergency. ethresear.ch, 2024. ethresear.ch/t/how-to-hard-fork-to-save-most-users-funds-in-a-quantum-emergency/18901